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ETAETHICAL NON-ANALYTICAL NATURALISM consists 
in the metaphysical thesis that normative properties are identical 
with or reducible to natural properties, and the epistemological 
thesis that we cannot come to a complete understanding of the nature of 
normative properties via conceptual analysis alone. In On What Matters, 
Derek Parfit (2011) argues that non-analytical naturalism is either false or 
incoherent. In Section 1, I show that his argument for this claim is unsuc-
cessful by showing that it rests on a tacit assumption about the nature of 
normative thought that non-analytical naturalists need not accept. In Section 
2, I show that escaping Parfit’s argument in this way is no ad hoc maneuver; 
as I demonstrate, the idea that non-analytical naturalists can exploit to escape 
Parfit’s argument is a familiar one. 
 
1. Parfit’s Argument 
 
Parfit (2011: 364) kicks off his argument against non-analytical naturalism 
(“naturalism” from here on) by distinguishing between two versions of the 
view – hard and soft naturalism. While both hard and soft naturalists accept 
the metaphysical and epistemological theses above, hard naturalists also ac-
cept the further dispensability thesis that we do not need or have any reasons 
to think normative thoughts. Soft naturalists1 deny this, claiming that we do 
need or have reasons to think normative thoughts.2 Parfit goes on to claim 
that if naturalism is hard, then naturalism is false,3 but that if naturalism is 
                                                            
1 Note that Parfit does not use the phrase “normative thought.” Instead, he uses the phrase 
“normative claim.” He does this, it seems, because part of the soft naturalist view is that we 
need or have reasons to think normative thoughts and speak normative language, and the 
phrase “normative claim” allows him to say this in fewer words. I am going to focus on the 
soft naturalist idea that we need normative thoughts, not the idea that we need normative 
language. I will be doing this not only because I think it would be more perspicuous to in-
vestigate the need for normative language and thoughts separately, but because a recurring 
scenario that Parfit employs throughout part 6 of On What Matters (i.e., the Burning Hotel) is 
a scenario principally involving normative thoughts, not language. 
2 Parfit suggests that the motivation for hard naturalism is the idea that, if we think norma-
tive and natural thoughts to think about the same properties, then normative thoughts would 
be superfluous, since we can just as well think natural thoughts to think about everything. As 
he writes, “… as Hard Naturalists claim, we would lose nothing if we replaced … normative 
beliefs with beliefs about certain natural facts” (369). While Parfit explicitly characterizes the 
motivation for hard naturalism, he does not do so with soft naturalism. Instead, he merely 
points out that Railton and Darwall favor such a view (365). Presumably, however, the moti-
vation for soft naturalism is just the idea that it seems like we would be at some kind of loss 
if we only thought natural thoughts. 
3 See Parfit (2011: 368-77) for his attempt to show that hard naturalism is false. 
M 
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soft, then naturalism is incoherent.4 Thus, according to Parfit, naturalism is 
either false or incoherent. 
Of course, the source of the threat of this argument to soft naturalism is 
the premise that soft naturalism is incoherent, which Parfit defends with the 
following auxiliary argument. He begins by assuming the truth of soft natu-
ralism for reductio. If, according to Parfit, we need or have reasons to think 
normative thoughts, then we need or have reasons to think them because 
there are irreducibly normative properties that we can only think about with 
them. So, we need or have reasons to think normative thoughts because 
there are irreducibly normative properties that we can only think about with 
them. But it is part of the soft naturalist view, Parfit claims, that there are no 
irreducibly normative properties. So, according to Parfit, soft naturalists are 
committed to the incoherent claim that there are and are not irreducibly 
normative properties.5 
Soft naturalists can resist this auxiliary argument and thereby resist Par-
fit’s main argument by attending to the premise that if we need or have rea-
sons to think normative thoughts, then we need or have reasons to think 
them because there are irreducibly normative properties that we can only 
think about with them. Parfit does not outright argue for this premise, but it 
is at least clear why he holds it. It is part of the soft naturalist view, Parfit 
says, that normative thoughts “state facts.”6 In other words, it is part of the 
soft naturalist view that we think normative thoughts to think about norma-
tive properties.7 Since, according to Parfit, we think normative thoughts to 
think about normative properties, that we think normative thoughts to think 
about normative properties is a reason to think them. If so, however, then it 
really is hard to see why we would need or have reason to think normative 
thoughts unless there are irreducibly normative properties that we could only 
think about with them. For if there were not, then we could instead think 
natural thoughts to think about everything, just as hard naturalists claim.  
But if normative thoughts have some other feature that distinguishes 
them from natural thoughts, then we might need or have reasons to continue 
                                                            
4 “Soft Naturalism is, I believe, an incoherent view” (Parfit 2011: 365). 
5 “If we had strong reasons to make irreducibly normative claims, that would have to be 
because (A) there are some important irreducibly normative facts, which we cannot state 
except by making such normative claims. If (A) is true, however, Soft Naturalism would fail. 
Naturalism is the view that (B) all normative facts are also, in the reductive sense, natural 
facts. Facts are in this sense natural if they could be restated by making nonnormative and 
naturalistic claims. So (A)’s truth would make (B) false, thereby undermining Naturalism” 
(Parfit 2011: 365-66). 
6 “… Naturalists assume that normative claims are intended to state facts” (Parfit 2011: 365, 
emphasis mine). 
7 Though I find the locution “think normative thoughts to think about normative properties” 
natural, it is, admittedly, idiosyncratic. Nevertheless, it is a less controversial and hence more 
charitable way of characterizing Parfit’s own terminology of fact-stating. Indeed, my character-
ization is likely the most charitable locution available, since common alternative ways of 
making this point, like claiming that normative thoughts describe normative properties, are 
also philosophically fraught. 
JOURNAL OF ETHICS & SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY | DISCUSSION NOTE 




thinking them in addition to thinking natural thoughts. In order for it to fol-
low that we need to think normative thoughts because, and only because, 
there are irreducibly normative properties that we could only think about 
with them, it needs to be the case that all there is to thinking normative 
thoughts is thinking about normative properties. In other words, soft natural-
ism is in trouble not merely if we think normative thoughts to think about 
normative properties, but rather if we think normative thoughts only to think 
about normative properties. To get around Parfit’s auxiliary argument and 
hence his main argument against naturalism, then, soft naturalists can reject 
his tacit assumption that we think normative thoughts only to think about 
normative properties. This is to say that getting around Parfit’s argument 
merely requires exploiting what I call Parfit’s Loophole.  
 
2. Parfit’s Loophole 
 
There are a number of different ways to exploit Parfit’s Loophole. One fa-
miliar way is to claim that we need or have reasons to think normative 
thoughts not only to think about normative properties, but also to do some-
thing else. Take an illustrative example of such a view from Tresan (2006), 
who suggests that what it is to have a normative thought is to think an ordi-
nary natural thought in the presence of a desire. For example, it might be that 
a subject does not have the normative thought that stealing is wrong unless 
she thinks the ordinary natural thought that stealing fails to maximize happi-
ness in company with desiring to avoid failing to maximize happiness. But if 
something like this is what it takes to think the normative thought that steal-
ing is wrong, then thinking that stealing is wrong is not only a matter of 
thinking about the property of failing to maximize happiness that stealing 
instantiates – because having it consists in thinking the ordinary natural 
thought that stealing fails to maximize happiness – but it is also a matter of 
doing something else, like settling the deliberative question of whether or not to 
steal, because having it also consists in desiring to avoid failing to maximize 
happiness. On Tresan’s view, then, it is not true that we think normative 
thoughts only to think about normative properties and so it does not follow 
that the only reason to think normative thoughts is to think about normative 
properties. 
Nevertheless, it might be thought that this is an uncharitable response to 
Parfit. After all, Parfit explicitly says that “unlike Non-Cognitivists, Naturalists 
assume that normative claims are intended to state facts,”8 which suggests 
that Parfit is not targeting views like Tresan’s – views on which normative 
thoughts are best understood in terms of both cognitive mental states like 
natural thoughts and noncognitive mental states like desires. But if we do not 
interpret Parfit as targeting views like Tresan’s, then his case against natural-
ism is incomplete because he does not discuss such views anywhere else in 
                                                            
8 Parfit (2011: 365, emphasis mine) 
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On What Matters. Such an interpretation seems especially uncongenial to Par-
fit, too, given that his overarching strategy in the book is to argue for his 
brand of nonnaturalism by eliminating every alternative to it.9 Moreover, not 
strictly cognitivist views of the nature of normative thought like Tresan’s 
have been around awhile. Indeed, Dreier (1990), Jackson and Pettit (1995), 
Sturgeon (2007) and Boisvert (2008) also suggest that normative thoughts are 
best understood in both cognitive and noncognitive terms.10 In any event, 
however, either Parfit’s objection is unsuccessful because it fails to show that 
all naturalist-friendly views of the nature of normative thought are incoher-
ent, or it is unsuccessful because it is incomplete.11 
It would seem that naturalists have a compelling response to Parfit, after 
all. Recall that, according to Parfit, naturalism is either false or incoherent. 
Naturalism is incoherent, Parfit claims, if it is held in conjunction with the 
soft naturalist claim that we need or have reasons to think normative 
thoughts. This is because, on Parfit’s auxiliary argument, soft naturalists are 
committed to the contradictory claim that there are and are not irreducibly 
normative properties, since the only reason we could allegedly need or have 
reasons to think normative thoughts is that there are irreducibly normative 
properties for us to think about with them. But getting around this auxiliary 
argument merely requires exploiting Parfit’s Loophole or denying that the 
only reason to think normative thoughts is to think about normative proper-
ties. Soft naturalists can do this by claiming that, while we think normative 
thoughts to think about normative properties, since having them consists in 
thinking ordinary natural thoughts, normative thoughts can also settle deliber-
ative questions, since thinking them also consists in desiring. In fact, as we 
saw, there are clear examples of philosophers sympathetic to soft naturalism 
who advocate this very sort of alternative view. So, Parfit’s auxiliary argu-
ment against soft naturalism fails, and his dilemma for naturalists in general 
along with it.12 
 
Nicholas Laskowski  
University of Southern California 
School of Philosophy 
nicholaslaskowski@gmail.com  
                                                            
9 As Schroeder (2011, emphasis mine) writes in his review of On What Matters, “Originally 
conceived as material for early chapters of the book, and later conceived as an appendix, the 
published part 6 [where Parfit discusses naturalism] is a complete treatise on metaethics in its 
own right, aspiring to survey and reject every possible competitor to Parfit’s own view as well as to defend 
his own view from every major objection.” 
10 More recently, views like this have also been explicitly put forward by Schroeder (2013), 
Toppinen (2013), and, on a natural understanding, Hay (2013), Finlay (2014). 
11 Although it is worth pointing out that Parfit’s objection might still be thought of as suc-
cessful against naturalists who are sympathetic with strictly cognitivist views of the nature of 
normative thought. 
12 Thanks to Stephen Finlay, Janet Levin, Susan Nuccetelli, Mark Schroeder, Ralph Wedg-
wood and those members of the USC Ethics Group who were available to discuss a draft of 
this paper, including Stephen Bero, Alex Dietz, Joe Horton, Nathan Howard, Nicola Kemp, 
Abelard Podgorski, Kenneth Silver, Aness Webster and Alex Heape. 
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